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NOTE
REGULATION OF NONCOMPLIANT PUBLICLY
OWNED TREATMENT WORKS UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
The federal government undertook a monumental task when it enacted the Clean
Water Act. Obtaining and maintaining high national water quality standards is a
challenge not easily met. The original enactment in 1972 was a first step, but
unrealistic expectations and unforeseen diffiulties necessitated several signiftant
amendments. This Note examines the continuing problem of municipal noncompli-
ance by highlighting past inadequacies and recent legislative and judicial
imtntat1ies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act, (CWA) represents a massive federal attempt to
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The CWA was originally titled the "Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972." See Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
1
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reverse the rapidly deteriorating quality of our nation's waterways.2 Mo-
tivated by the inadequacy of state water quality standards3 and common
law remedies,4 Congress sought to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."5 The CWA
implements this mandate by requiring that all effluent dischargers com-
ply with a series of increasingly stringent water quality standards. 6
Under the CWA, all dischargers were required to attain secondary treat-
ment 7 by July 1, 1977.8 All waters were to be fishable and swimmable
(1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 note (1982)). In 1977, Congress enacted several sig-
nificant amendments to the original 1972 Act. The amendments became known as the
"Clean Water Act of 1977." Set Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1251 note (1978)). Following these amendments, the entire Act has commonly
been referred to as the "Clean Water Act." See id.; 8 [Curr. Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1987
(Apr. 21, 1978) (Environmental Protection Agency announced it would refer to the origi-
nal Act and all subsequent amendments as the Clean Water Act to "avoid confusion [in
its] dealings with the public, the press, and the courts"). This Note refers to the 1972 Act
and all subsequent amendments as the Clean Water Act (CWA).
2. See 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1982); Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (Concermig the Performance of the Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants Pro-
gram): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transp., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1709 (1981) (statement of Anne M. Gorsuch, Ad-
ministrator, Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Con-
struction Grants Program]; Note, Sewers, Clean Water, and Planned Growth. Restructurng the
Federal Pollution Abatement Effirt, 86 YALE L.J. 733 (1977).
3. See H. LIEBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS 11-14 (1975). Previously, en-
forcement of water quality standards was the sole responsibility of state officials. With few
exceptions, however, states failed to enforce water pollution legislation, probably due to
the fear of driving industry from the state with stricter environmental controls. Id at 14.
4. At common law, a variety of legal actions against a polluter are available. See
Hall v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 259 Minn. 101, 106 N.W.2d 8 (1960) (private nuisance);
Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 87 P.2d
195 (1939) (public nuisance); Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 40 N.J.
Super. 62, 122 A.2d 233 (1956) (riparian rights). The CWA precludes federal courts from
invoking federal common law remedies to impose more stringent effluent limitations than
those under the CWA. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
Common law remedies were often unsatisfactory. Private nuisance demanded proof
of a substantial and unreasonable interference with the private use and enjoyment of one's
property. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
If a plaintiff was successful in meeting this standard of proof, the court was required to
"balance the equities" between competing interests, which often favored the polluter. Id
The Boomer court refused to enjoin the operation of a polluting cement company, notwith-
standing the findings that a nuisance existed and that plaintiffs had suffered substantial
damage. Relying on the large disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and of
the injunction, the court assessed permanent damages and allowed the defendant to con-
tinue its operations. Id Public nuisance required an adequate demonstration of standing
to sue. The plaintiff was required to assert an injury to a public, not merely personal,
interest. See Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Or.
654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
6. See Note, Judicial Maelstrom in Federal Waters. A Composite Interpretation of The Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 45 FoRDHAM L. REV. 625, 627 (1976).
7. Secondary treatment refers to sewage treatment techniques capable of removing
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by July 1, 1983.9 Ultimately, all navigable waters 10 must be free from
pollutant discharges by 1985.11
Regulation of effluent discharges from publicly owned treatment
works (POTWs)12 is a primary objective of the CWA. 13 Municipal dis-
up to 90% of all organic matter in sewage. See OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAMS OPERA-
TIONS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PRIMER FOR WASTEWATER TREATMENT 5
(1980).
Secondary treatment is generally achieved through one of two recognized processes-
trickling filters or activated sludge processes. Under the trickling filter technique, primar-
ily treated effluent passes through a bed of stones approximately three to six feet deep.
Bacteria gather and multiply on these stones until they can consume most of the organic
matter in the sewage. Processed water then trickles out and is subjected to further treat-
ment. While activated sludge techniques also treat sewage with bacteria, the process is
accelerated by mixing the sludge with increased amounts of air and bacteria. Id
The EPA currently defines secondary treatment in terms of biochemical oxygen de-
mand (BOD), suspended solids, and pH. See 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1983). Present regula-
tions reguire that BOD and suspended solid levels of treated effluent not exceed 30
milligrams per liter. Id § 133.102(a), (b). PH levels must consistently range between 6.0
and 9.0. Id. § 133.102(c). These treatment requirements may be relaxed where POTWs
are designed to handle both sanitary sewage and storm water. See id § 133.103.
Because critics argue that one inflexible standard is unfairly harsh to certain commu-
nities, the EPA is reviewing the present definition of secondary treatment and considering
a more flexible, less stringent standard. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
1981 ANNUAL REPORT 75 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1981].
Congress has already responded in part by acknowledging certain alternative treatment
processes as the equivalent of secondary treatment. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(4) (1982); see
also Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
While most municipalities are subject to secondary treatment standards, the EPA
may require a more stringent level of treatment where necessary to achieve set water qual-
ity standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1982).
8. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1982).
9. See id. § 1251(a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) provides: "[I]t is the national goal that
wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the
water be achieved by July 1, 1983." Id
10. See i. § 1362(7). Section 602 of the original Act defines navigable waters as "wa-
ters of the United States and territorial seas." Id Courts have generally held that CWA
provisions apply to navigable waters only. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil &
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1947).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
12. Id § 1292(2)(A), (B). The CWA defines "treatment works" as "devices and sys-
tems used in the storage, treatment, recycling, and reclamation of municipal sewage or
industrial wastes of a liquid nature to implement section 1281 of this title, or necessary to
recycle or reuse water at the most economical cost over the estimated life of the works
. .. Id § 1292(2)(A). The CWA also contains a catch-all definition of treatment
works: "any other method or system for preventing, abating, reducing, storing, treating,
separating, or disposing of municipal waste, including storm water runoff, or industrial
waste, including waste in combined storm water and sanitary sewer systems." Id
§ 1292(2)(B).
13. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1709; cf. 33 U.S.C.




et al.: Regulation Of Noncompliant Publicly Owned Treatment Works Under T
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
charge of raw or partially treated sewage is a principal source of the pol-
lution defiling our national waterways. 14  Municipal wastewater
treatment facilities constitute approximately twenty-six percent of all ef-
fluent dischargers.15 Consequently, the CWA provided for the reduction
of municipal water pollution by requiring that municipalities attain a
uniform minimum level of wastewater treatment.' 6 To facilitate compli-
ance with these minimum wastewater treatment levels, Title II of the Act
authorized federal grants for the construction of wastewater treatment
facilities. 17
Although most industrial pollutersia have complied with CWA dead-
lines,19 POTW compliance has been unsatisfactory. Over fifty percent of
all POTWs failed to meet the July 1, 1977 deadline for secondary treat-
ment of sewage. 20 "Major" municipal dischargers 2 1 enjoyed even less
14. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS AND TRANSP., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT CONCERNING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREAT-
MENT CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM, H.R. REP. No. 97-30, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON CONSTRUCrION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981]. In-
deed, one court has observed that:
The discharge of sewage into a body of water may create severe environmental
damage. The decomposition of organic matter consumes oxygen, and excessive
oxygen demands may deprive fish, shellfish and aquatic wildlife of dissolved oxy-
gen necessary to life. Solid matter from sewage may settle in layers on the floor
of the water body and suffocate life forms that cannot escape. Acids and heavy
metals may poison the water. In short, unrestricted discharges of sewage can
cause environmental damage which in turn will affect the nation's health and
welfare. The legacy of unrestricted sewage discharge is disease, reduced fishery
and recreation resources, poisoned water supplies and ugly water bodies.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
15. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 130 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1980]. As of February 12, 1980, 15,395
out of 58,907 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits issued
by the EPA were issued to municipal dischargers. Id
16. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(B) (1982).
17. Set id. § 1251(a) (4) (national policy that federal financial assistance be provided
to construct POTWs). Subsequent amendments carried out this mandate by authorizing
federal funds for construction of POTWs. See id § 1287; see also it7fa notes 28-35 and
accompanying text.
18. The CWA differentiates between municipal dischargers (POTWs) and private in-
dustrial dischargers. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (i) (1982). Throughout
this Note, non-municipal dischargers will be referred to as industrial dischargers.
19. Approximately 80% of all industrial dischargers were in compliance with the 1977
secondary treatment deadline. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1979 AN-
NUAL REPORT 113-14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1979]. In
1981, over 90% of all industrial dischargers were in compliance with the secondary treat-
ment deadline. See Hanngs on the Construction Grants rogram, supra note 2, at 1713 (testi-
mony of Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency).
20. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS & TRANSP., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT,
H.R. REP. No. 97-30, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1980]; HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977,
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success, with fewer than thirty-five percent meeting the 1977 deadline. 22
As of 1980, eighty-seven percent of all POTWs occasionally violated dis-
charge limitations.23 Thirty-one percent of these violators had serious
compliance problems, exceeding discharge limitations over fifty percent
of the time.24 As a result, hopes for compliance with the 1985 standard
appear remote. 2
5
Although many factors have plagued municipal performance, POTW
noncompliance with CWA objectives appears to be the result of two fun-
damental problems. First, deficiencies in the Title II Construction
Grants Program have prevented the timely construction of cost-efficient
POTWs capable of achieving and maintaining CWA water quality stan-
dards. 26 Second, the CWA lacks enforcement provisions that effectively
discourage unsatisfactory POTW performance.27 This Note examines
past deficiencies, highlights legislative efforts addressing past problems,
and proposes possible solutions to remaining problems.
H.R. REP. No. 139, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1977) (initial reports estimate that 55% of all
municipal dischargers failed to comply with the 1977 treatment deadline).
21. Because of limited resources, the EPA launched the Major Source Enforcement
Effort (MSEE) in late 1977. See Reed, Enforcement, in AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL LAW: 1980 542, 556 (E.L.I. 1980). Under the MSEE, the EPA focuses only on major
dischargers for the purpose of enforcement priority. Id at 556. Under this scheme, mu-
nicipal facilities discharging more than one million gallons per day or serving a population
of 10,000 or greater are deemed "major." See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program,
supra note 2, at 1778 (testimony of Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency). As of 1980, 3731 permit holders were major municipal facilities. Id
22. As of 1980, 106 of these major municipal permit holders failed to attain the 1977
secondary treatment deadline. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1980,
supra note 20, at 3; see also ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY- 1980, supra note 15, at 131 (as of
February 1980, the EPA estimated that 63% of all "major" municipal treatment facilities
were in violation of CWA secondary treatment requirements).
23. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., COSTLY WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS FAIL TO
PERFORM AS EXPECTED 9 (1980).
24. See id. Because of both the dismal compliance rate displayed by most POTWs
and the relative success experienced with industrial dischargers, the EPA has indicated its
intention to pursue municipal violators more actively. See OFFICE OF WATER OPERATING
GUIDANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM, OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 1984 at 29 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FISCAL REPORT-1984].
25. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1525 (testimony of J.
Taylor Banks, Senior Staff Attorney, National Resources Defense Council); see also To
Amend and Extend Authonzations for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Hearings on HR.
3199 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transporta-
tion, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977) (EPA estimated that over half of the nation's POTWs
will not be in compliance with secondary treatment by 1985, with full compliance unlikely
until 1993).
26. See generally infra notes 28-85 and accompanying text (discussing past failures of
the federal program).
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II. THE MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT CONSTRUCTION
GRANTS PROGRAM
A. Past Failures of the Federal Program
I. Inadequate Federal Funding
In order to achieve the effluent limitations set forth in the CWA,28
municipalities were promised lavish federal grants for the construction of
sewage treatment plants.29 Congress realized that POTW compliance
with the Act's rigid water quality standards heavily depended upon fed-
eral financial assistance.30 Accordingly, the Act authorized a maximum
of eighteen billion dollars over fiscal years 1973 through 1975 for the
construction of wastewater treatment facilities. 3 1 As of 1981, over thirty-
three billion dollars had been spent on sewage treatment programs,
32
making Title II of the CWA the nation's second most expensive public
works program. 33 Until recently, these federal grants comprised seventy-
five percent of all wastewater treatment construction expenditures,
34
with state and local governments financing the remaining twenty-five
percent. 3
5
Despite this formidable financial commitment, it soon became appar-
ent that initial Title II funding was insufficient, rendering POTW com-
pliance with future deadlines doubtful. In drafting the CWA, Congress
seriously underestimated the huge costs of achieving secondary treatment
standards. 36 Congress has traditionally authorized four billion dollars
28. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(l)-(2), 1311(b)(1)(B) (1982).
29. See Note, supra note 2, at 733.
30. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 2
(perception that sewage discharge readily susceptible to control if massive investment of
federal funds made).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1982). In order to implement this federal mandate, Congress
appropriated $5 billion for fiscal year 1973, 56 billion for fiscal year 1974, and $7 billion
for fiscal year 1975. See id.
32. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1742 (testimony of
Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency); OFFICE OF
WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINANCING WATER POLLUTION CONTROL:
THE STATE ROLE (DRAFT) 5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FINANCING WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL]; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1981, supra note 7, at 75.
33. See Senate Is Starting On Reform Of US Construction Grants For Sewage Treatment Plants,
39 CONG. Q., June 13, 1981, 1043. The only public works program receiving greater
federal appropriations is the National Highway Program. See id
34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a) (1982). In 1981, however, Congress amended section
1282, reducing the federal share to 55% of all construction costs. See inia note 47 and
accompanying text.
35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a) (1982).
36. Hunciker, The Clean Water Act of 1977-Modiftations of the Municipal Program, 2
HAj.v. ENVTL. L. REV. 127, 129 (1977). When enacted in 1972, Congress estimated that
$63 billion (in 1972 dollars) would be required to satisfy CWA goals. See Hearings on the
Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1753 (testimony of Anne M. Gorsuch, Adminis-
trator, Environmental Protection Agency).
[Vol. 10
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annually for the construction grants program. 3 7 As of 1980, however,
120 billion dollars were required to meet CWA water quality standards. 38
The cost will inevitably increase with inflation.39
Although initial federal appropriations were grossly inadequate, Con-
gress has consistently reduced funding of the Title II program. While the
Clean Water Act Amendments of 197740 authorized five billion dollars
annually for fiscal years 1979 through 1982,4 1 this sum, when reduced by
inflation, amounts to only 3.4 billion dollars annually in 1972 dollars.
42
In effect, the 1977 amendments reduced funding for the Construction
Grants Program by almost thirty percent. Failure to appropriate all au-
thorized funds has further diminished available grant monies.
43
37. See OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERATIONS, MUNICIPAL CONSTR. DIV., U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN WATER FACT SHEET 1 (1979).
38. See OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERATIONS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, 1980 NEEDS SURVEY: COST ESTIMATES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLICLY-
OWNED WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES 4 (F.R.D. No. 19, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as 1980 NEEDS SURVEY].
To identify specific costs for specific types of waste treatment, the EPA examines costs
for eight different types of treatment. These methods include: secondary treatment (cate-
gory I); advanced secondary treatment (category IIA); advanced waste treatment (cate-
gory IIB); correction of infiltration/inflow (category ILIA); major rehabilitation of sewers
(category IIIB); new collector sewers (category IVA); new interceptor sewers (category
IVB); and control of combined sewer overflow (category V). See id at 2-3. Of the $119.9
billion required, the EPA determined that $55.8 billion was required to finance categories
1, 11, and IVB. See id. at 4. Financing combined sewer overflows (category V) will require
$37.17 billion. See id at 5.
The Needs Survey is a report, required by statute, that attempts to provide a detailed
estimate of the cost of construction of POTWs that will comply with the CWA's 1983
goals. See 33 U.S.C. § 1375(b)(1) (1982); see also 1980 NEEDS SURVEY, supra, at 1. Prior to
1980, surveys were published in 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1978. Id
39. See ifra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
40. See Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
33 U.S.C. (1982)); see also supra note 1.
41. See 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1982). Under section 1287, Congress authorized $1 billion
for fiscal year 1977, $4.5 billion for fiscal year 1978, and $5 billion annually for each fiscal
year 1979 through 1982 to implement the Title II Construction Grants Program. Id.
42. This figure assumed a 7.8% annual rate of inflation as indicated by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). See Hearings on the Construction Grants togram, supra note 2, at 1529
(statement of the Natural Resources Defense Council).
43. See Ledbetter, Dozier & Jordan, Funding Municipal Wastewater Facilities in Georgia,
10 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 206, 208 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Ledbetter]. Although
Congress authorized $5 billion annually for fiscal years 1979 through 1982, Congress only
appropriated $4.2 billion in fiscal year 1979, $3.4 billion in fiscal year 1980, and $3.2
billion in fiscal year 1981. Id; see also REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-
1980, supra note 20, at 4 (pressures to balance the budget and bring inflation under control
resulted in failure to appropriate all initially authorized funds); Hearings on the Construction
Grants Programs, supra note 2, at 1742 (only $16.9 billion appropriated between 1977 and
1981); FINANCING WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 32, at 5 (slightly more than
$30 billion appropriated to states since 1972); cf Braga, Publicly Owned Treatment Works, in
AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: 1980, at 410, 413 (E.L.I. 1980) (Carter Ad-
ministration appointed $3.7 billion for 1981 fiscal budget). Additionally, Congress re-
19841
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Recent conservative environmental and fiscal policies have also dra-
matically diminished federal contributions,44 aggravating municipal ef-
forts to construct POTWs capable of meeting federal water quality
standards. Under the Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction
Grant Amendments of 1981,45 federal funding for the Construction
Grants Program was slashed to 2.4 billion dollars annually,46 a mere
twenty-six percent of the funding levels authorized under the original
Act. The 1981 amendments also reduced federal subsidization of con-
struction costs from seventy-five percent to fifty-five percent. 4 7 Addition-
ally, several treatment systems became ineligible for federal funding.48
While these conservative policies shift funding responsibilities away
from the federal level, state and local officials are often unable to raise
scinded $1.7 billion in fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1981 funds, reducing the effective
funding level for each of these years to approximately $2.4 billion. See Hearings on the
Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1742; Ledbetter, supra.
44. See FINANCING WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 32, at 7 (1981 amend-
ments significantly alter the role of the federal government). These changes in part imple-
ment the "New Federalism" policy embraced by the Reagan Administration. Id at 8.
Under this policy, several programs historically funded and managed at the federal level
are now being turned over to similar state agencies. Id. at 8-9.
45. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.
(1982)). The Reagan Administration successfully enacted legislation that substantially
amended the CWA. These amendments are generally referred to as the "Municipal Was-
tewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981." See id. (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1251 note (Supp. V 1981)).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1982). Under the 1981 amendments, Congress authorized $2.4
billion annually for fiscal years 1982 through 1985. Id.
47. Id § 1282(a)(1). Federal reimbursement of 75% of all construction costs is pre-
served for projects granted funding prior to October 1, 1984. Federal contributions of 55%
of construction costs is effective for all grants authorized after the October 1, 1984 dead-
line. Additionally, the federal share may be reduced below the 55% limit for any state
upon the request by the governor of that state in concurrence with the EPA administrator.
Id.
48. See id. § 1281 (g)(1). Pursuant to this section, federal funds will only be appropri-
ated for "projects for secondary treatment or more stringent treatment, or any cost effec-
tive alternative thereto, new interceptors and appurtenances, and infiltration-inflow
correction." Id Specific projects funded include wastewater treatment plants, projects to
correct infiltration and rehabilitation of major sewers, collector sewers, interceptor sewers,
and projects to correct and combine sewer overflows. FINANCING WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL, supra note 32, at 7.
Operations not eligible for federal subsidization include construction of facilities to
handle combined storm water and sanitary sewer overflows, see 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (n)(1)
(1982), and construction of POTW reserve capacity, in excess of existing needs, for antici-
pated community growth. See id. § 1284(a)(5); see also FINANCING WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL, supra note 32, at 7. Additionally, the Title II program does not fund opera-
tional and maintenance costs. Id.
Some funding for these precluded programs, however, may be available. See 33
U.S.C. § 1281(n)(1) (1982) (funds available to states under section 1285 to address water
quality problems due to the impact of discharges from combined storm water and sanitary
sewer overflows where correction of such discharges is a major priority); see also id
[Vol. 10
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the additional money necessary to satisfy federal objectives. 4 9 Even
under ideal economic conditions, it is doubtful that the bond markets
which traditionally finance construction of POTWs can absorb a massive
increase in state and local expenditures.50 Economically depressed re-
gions face more serious obstacles. Because of their low visibility, POTWs
are unable to successfully compete for scarce revenues against interests
that are more popular and better organized. 5 1 In decaying urban centers
experiencing a declining tax base, local governments are financially un-
able to appropriate additional money for POTW construction.52
2. Grants Program Delays
In addition to inadequate federal funding, municipal efforts to satisfy
CWA water quality standards have been hampered by serious delays in
the distribution of Title II construction grants. Applicants presently seek
funding through the complex and time-consuming Construction Grants
Program administered by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).53 The grants program is divided into three steps: Step I, facility
§ 1284(c) (funding for reserve capacity available for grants awarded prior to October 1,
1984).
For a more detailed discussion of projects eligible for federal funding under the Title
II program, see inbfa notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
49. See Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (The Effects of Proposed
Reductions in Federal Assistance for the Construction of Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plants):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigatwns and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1981) (statement of Diana Clark, President,
Texas League of Women Voters, Austin, Tex.) [hereinafter cited as Effects of Proposed
Reductions].
50. See Hunciker, supra note 36, at 137. Traditionally, state and local governments
have financed nearly all of their 75% share through long-term borrowing, typically in the
form of tax exempt bonds. Id Thus, municipal efforts to raise funding to construct
POTWs pivots upon the health of the bond market. Id
In addition to the health of the bond market, state and local laws normally place
ceilings upon state and local borrowing. Id at 139; see also Article, Municipal Bonds and
Property Tax Limitations, 7 ENVTL. L. 453, 472-73 (1979) (many state and local statutes
restrict the total amount of bonds that may be outstanding at any time to a fixed percent-
age of the assessed value of the issuing municipality).
51. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1542 (statement of
Merilyn B. Reeves, Natural Resources Director, the League of Women Voters); see also
Effects of Proposed Reductions, supra note 49, at 287-88. As observed by one official, "[t]he
reality of local community finance is that, unlike most other local capital improvements,
streets, schools, fire station [sic], water supply and flood control projects which have high
visibility and high local priority, wastewater treatment plants because they mostly benefit
other communities downstream have low visibility and low priority." Id.
52. See Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants Program. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1981) (statement of Elizabeth Head, former President of the League of
Women Voters of Rhode Island) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Municipal Wastewater
Treatment ].
53. See Hunciker, supra note 36, at 131.
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planning; Step II, design; and Step III, construction. 54 Separate applica-
tion, decisionmaking, and funding procedures are used at each stage.55
This arduous process causes significant construction delays. Treat-
ment facilities costing less than one million dollars can expect the entire
grant process to take 7.47 years.56 Projects that cost over fifty million
dollars will require over 11.52 years to become operational.57
Unfortunately, these delays will place many communities in violation
of impending treatment deadlines. Under section 301(i) of the CWA,
POTWs that are dependent on federal assistance must achieve secondary
treatment by July 1, 1988.58 This deadline appears absolute, notwith-
54. See 40 C.F.R. § 35.903 (1983). During Step I, planners examine project needs and
alternatives. Step II involves preparing construction drawings and specifications. Step III
involves actual POTW construction. Id
55. Id The textual discussion only begins to dramatize the significance of current
administrative delays in the Title II program. A House Subcommittee Report recently
observed that: "The program's administration has been directed by dozens of regulations,
policy memoranda, and general operating guidance documents from EPA, each contribut-
ing to the seemingly endless list of prerequisites to be satisfied before a project could be
approved and funded." REPORT ON CONSTRUCTON GRANTS PROGRAM-1980, supra note
20, at 5. Each prerequisite is mandatory with local officials failing to comply at their peril.
Id at 6.
56. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1754. POTW con-
struction is divided into five distinct phases including: Prestep I (start award of Step I);
Step I (Step I award completed); Step II (preparation of Step II application to Step II
completion); Step III (preparation of Step III application to completion of construction);
and Post Step III (completion of construction to final project close out). Id Approxi-
mately 50% of total project time is for Step III and Post Step III activities. Id Step I
consumes approximately 33% of total project time. Id; see also id at 1527 (statement of
National Resources Defense Council) (Step III and Post Step III phases consume at least
half of the total project time).
57. See id at 1754; see also REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1980,
supra note 20, at 4 (construction of a POTW takes an average of eight years from submis-
sion of planning grant application to completion of construction); ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY-1981, supra note 7, at 74.
58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1) (1982). Under subsection (i)(1), where the United
States has failed to provide financial assistance to eligible POTWs in time to achieve efflu-
ent deadlines set forth at 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(B), compliance with such deadlines may
be extended by the Administrator until the earliest date by which compliance can be
achieved with federal funds. In no event, however, shall this deadline for compliance be
extended beyond July 1, 1988. Id
The CWA originally contained no statutory mechanism for extending performance
deadlines. See Rae, Enforcement, in AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAw: 1982, at
699, 721 (E.L.I. 1982). As the 1977 deadline for secondary treatment approached, how-
ever, funding delays rendered many POTWs incapable of compliance. While the EPA
chose to exercise prosecutorial discretion, declining to seek legal action against noncomp-
liant POTWs, see 7 [Curr. Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 219-21 (June 6, 1976) (in lieu of
prosecution, POTW compliance schedule set forth in Enforcement Compliance Schedule
Letter (ECSL)), state water quality officials argued that POTWs were required to meet
CWA deadlines notwithstanding delinquent funding. See State Water Control Bd. v.
Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977). In Train, the circuit court agreed, holding that CWA
secondary treatment deadlines were unconditional. Id at 924. Although section 301
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standing continued dependence on federal grants. 5 9 Because of the pres-
ent lag between application and completion, however, many POTWs
will not be operational and in compliance with effluent standards before
1990.60
While making treatment deadlines unattainable, grant delays also
threaten to escalate construction costs, making compliance with CWA
objectives doubtful under existing funding levels. Inflated program costs
are rapidly outdistancing annual appropriations. Since 1970, the price
index for nonresidential construction has increased at a rate of 9.8 per-
cent annually.61 Assuming a stable price index, inflation can be ex-
pected to increase total project costs by twenty billion dollars within the
next ten years.6 2 Since many POTWs may not achieve secondary treat-
ment until after 1990,63 inflation related costs will be significantly higher.
3. POTW Design
Although adequate funding is critical, effective sewage treatment also
depends upon proper selection, design, and construction of treatment fa-
cilities.64 Since the program's inception, however, the EPA has squan-
dered precious appropriations by financing overly expensive, needlessly
sophisticated,65 and environmentally suspect 66 POTWs which are wholly
deadlines were deemed absolute, the Train court held that in subsequent enforcement ac-
tions, courts must consider POTW ability to comply when fashioning sanctions. Id at
927. Spurred by the inequities of the Train decision, Congress promptly amended the
CWA, directly linking compliance with timely federal financial assistance. Pub. L. No. 95-
217, § 45, 91 Stat. 1584 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1) (1982)).
59. See WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (BNA) No. 79, at 2 (Supp. Sept. 30, 1982).
60. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1981, supra note 7, at 74.
61. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1529. This rate is
significantly higher than the 7.8% increase in the Consumer Price Index. Id
62. See id. at 1547 (statement of Merilyn B. Reeves, National Resources Director,
League of Women Voters of the United States).
Indeed, $20 billion in inflation-related costs is perhaps optimistic. In 1972, legislators
believed that CWA objectives could be achieved at a total cost of $63 billion in 1972
dollars. By 1978, however, construction costs had climbed to $96 billion. Id at 1718
(statement of Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
As of 1980, total costs had again risen to $120 billion. See 1980 NEEDS SURVEY, supra note
38, at 4. This increase is entirely due to inflation. Cf Hearings on the Construction Grants
Program, supra note 2, at 1760.
Advocates of present policies, however, are quick to point out that such figures are
misleading. For example, total 1978 needs in 1980 dollars were estimated at $130 billion.
See 1980 NEEDS SURVEY, supra note 38, at 14. Total 1980 needs, however, were only
$119.9 billion, representing a 10.67% decrease in total needs. Id
63. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1547 (statement of
Merilyn B. Reeves, National Resources Director, League of Women Voters of the United
States) (funding anticipated for next 22 years).
64. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 3
(cleanup of municipal discharges results from treatment plants properly designed, con-
structed, equipped, operated, and maintained, and not inevitable result of expenditures).
65. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1527 (statement of
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inconsistent with community needs.67 Between ten and twenty percent
of these POTWs are poorly designed, 68 resulting in repeated permit vio-
lations and necessitating additional "fix-up" grants to remedy initial
errors.
69
The CWA's legacy of poorly designed POTWs is largely attributable
to the EPA's erroneous "presumption" that grant applicants are quali-
fied to oversee POTW construction.70 In reality, municipalities often
lack the technical and administrative expertise necessary to design and
National Resources Defense Council) (some plants overdesigned and include unneccessary
"gold-plated" components); see also REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-
1980, supra note 20, at 11; 9 [Curr. Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 441-42 (July 14, 1978) (EPA
accused of wasting precious funding by financing programs that were not cost-efficient).
66. While most communities prefer to utilize conventional treatment techniques, such
systems frequently are unable to purify waters of major urban areas adequately, because
such techniques do a relatively poor job of removing both nutrients and toxic substances
from community water systems. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1979, supra note 19, at
123-24. Operation of large conventional facilities has also resulted in a lowering of the
groundwater table. Id.; Randolph, Rural America Needs Specia! Programs For Sanitation Plo-
gress, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LESS COSTLY WASTEWATER TREATMENT SYSTEMS
FOR SMALL COMMUNITIES 4 (1977).
67. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1527 (statement of
Natural Resources Defense Council) (some plant designs are the wrong solutions to
problems better addressed by other treatment techniques).
Conventional treatment techniques are often ill-suited to small community needs.
Such facilities are often more expensive to construct, see OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM
OPERATIONS, U. S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DETERMINING WASTEWATER TREAT-
MENT COSTS FOR YOUR COMMUNITY 11 (1979), and more expensive to operate and
maintain. See id. at 13. Generally, residents of communities with less than 50,000 should
have sewage treatment costs that range between $66 and $130 annually. Costs that exceed
this range will place a heavy financial burden on poor residents. Costle, Small Communities
and Wastewater Treatment Costs. A New Vtew, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LESS COSTLY
WASTEWATER TREATMENT FOR SMALL COMMUNITIES 1, 2 (1977). Recent statistics indi-
cate, however, that of approximately 250 communities surveyed with populations under
500,000 using conventional systems, 40% charged residents more than $100 annually.
About 10% of these communities levied fees of $200 annually. In some communities with
less than 10,000 residents, treatment costs approached $300 per year. Id
Problems with needlessly expensive equipment are exemplified by the federally subsi-
dized POTW at Greenville, Maine. There, the EPA spent $3 million in sophisticated
sewage treatment equipment for a community of 1350 residents. Because of the plant's
high operational costs and frequent malfunctions, the POTW was never accepted by the
township and was closed in 1979. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1979, supra note 19, at
121.
68. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981,supra note 14, at 15-16.
69. The CWA does not authorize funding to "fix up" previously constructed plants
that fail to perform properly due to design or construction deficiencies. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1284(d)(2) (1982) (failure to meet design specifications and effluent limitations shall be
corrected in a timely manner at other than federal expense).
70. See 40 C.F.R. § 30.340-3 (1983). "Submission of a grant application shall consti-
tute an applicant's assurance that he can and will meet the standards set forth in § 30.340-
2. An applicant may be presumed to be responsible in the absence of any question as to
his ability to meet the standards." Id
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construct a cost-efficient treatment facility.7  Acknowledging their limi-
tations, many communities seek private assistance from consulting firms
that have minimal experience with POTW construction.72 Local offi-
cials, equally unfamiliar with POTW construction, seldom know if they
are receiving sound direction.
73
Administrative guidance also has proven sorely deficient. Section 203
of the CWA presently requires EPA design reviews for all federally
funded POTWs. 74 Unfortunately, understaffed and underqualified
agency personnel limit the effectiveness of EPA assistance and foster per-
ceptions of EPA incompetence. 75 Indeed, "[t]he agency and the States
have been criticized for inadequate reviews of plans and specifications
and the oversight of construction and project management activities.
Such reviews are often minimal and have not been as comprehensive as desired.
'" 76
4. Operation and Maintenance
CWA water quality objectives can only be attained if on-line POTWs
are operated and maintained adequately. Unless provisions are made for
proper operation and maintenance (O&M), even well designed and con-
structed POTWs will perform poorly.7 7 Indeed, expert O&M can sub-
stantially improve the performance capabilities of even poorly designed
POTWs.78
Nevertheless, studies repeatedly indicate that noncompliance with
present water quality standards is largely due to substandard O&M of
expensive POTWs.79 Although they employ sophisticated technologies,
71. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 23.
72. Id. One expert observed, "If you look at the proliferation of engineering firms
since the start of the EPA program, you will find there is a tremendous increase in the
total number of firms involved in this work. Some of those people came in with no experi-
ence whatsoever." Id. In an attempt to discourage incompetent participation, the CWA
now imposes liability on consulting engineers for design and construction errors. See bnfra
notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
73. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM- 1981, supra note 14, at 23; see
also id at 18 (inability of local officials to obtain adequate information on the performance
capabilities and reliability of equipment).
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1283(a) (1982). As a condition to receiving federal funding, sec-
tion 1283(a) requires all applicants to submit "plans, specifications, and estimates for each
proposed project for the construction of treatment works .... I Id.
75. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM- 1981, supra note 14, at 24; see
also id at 28.
76. Id at 24 (emphasis in original).
77. I. at 9. Expert O&M is required in part because of sophisticated technologies
employed by treatment facilities. Such techniques are necessary in light of the waste
treated. POTWs handle raw sewage that varies in strength, composition, and volume.
Unlike the predictable cold chemistry of manufacturing, POTW processes are biological
and easily upset. Id
78. Id. at 11.
79. See id at 9. Not only do poor O&M techniques result in substandard perform-
ance, they fuel dissatisfaction with the entire construction grants program, leading to an
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large municipal facilities are frequently operated by underpaid and un-
derqualified personnel.80
Past administrative policies have done little to encourage proficient
O&M of federally subsidized POTWs. Initial EPA efforts deemphasized
efficient O&M techniques, instead concentrating upon the issuance of
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits and
Title II construction grants. 8 1 Additionally, funding for critical training
programs has continually declined. Under the Act, Congress initially au-
thorized 7.5 million dollars annually for POTW operator training pro-
grams.82 By 1978, however, annual authorizations were slashed to three
million dollars.8 3 Failure to appropriate all authorized funds further re-
duced federal money earmarked for O&M training.84 The EPA instead
chose to rely upon private sector resources and an aggressive enforcement
ambivalent federal commitment. One congressman recently observed that, "[wie simply
cannot ignore the incongruity of spending $5 billion a year in federal funds for new plants
with the foreknowledge that only a fraction of them will be operated properly .... Id.
at 4.
80. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1543-44 (statement of
Merilyn B. Reeves, Natural Resources Director, League of Women Voters of the United
States). In light of past operator incompetence, federal funding for improved operator
education programs must be authorized. Federal officials must establish a certification
program. Id.; see also REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM- 1981, supra note 14,
at 72. In the alternative, communities should be encouraged to contract out O&M of the
POTW to a private contractor with a higher degree of expertise. See A City Successfuly
Manages a Private Sector Water Treatment Operation, Gov'T EXEC., Sept. 1980, reprinted in Hear-
ings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 3036.
81. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1709 (statement of
Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). Upon enact-
ment of the 1972 CWA, large sums of money authorized to fund thousands of projects
suddenly became available. The EPA was under considerable pressure to move grants out
to municipalities as fast as possible. Since EPA resources were limited, efforts were con-
centrated upon processing grant applicants. Id; see also REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION
GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 2. With efforts focused upon grant applicants,
ensuring proper O&M of these facilities was initially overlooked. Id at 9.
82. See 33 U.S.C. § 1254(u)(2) (1982). Section 1254(u)(2) provides funding for section
1254(g)(1). Id Under section 12 54 (g)(1), Congress authorizes CWA funds which finance
pilot programs for the training and retraining of personnel that operate and maintain
POTWs. See id § 12 54(g)(1). These programs may be initiated in cooperation with state
and local agencies and educational institutions. Id To fund these pilot programs ade-
quately, Congress initially authorized $7.5 million for fiscal years 1973-75. See id
§ 1254(u)(2). No funding was authorized for 1976. Id In 1977, Congress authorized $2
million. Id
83. See id. § 1254(u)(2). Authorizations for section 1254(g)(1) pilot programs were
reduced to $3 million annually for fiscal years 1978-82. Id
Other educational programs have experienced similar cutbacks. The CWA permits
funding of grants for training projects, see id. § 1254(g) (3) (A), and research fellowships for
promising POTW research. See id § 1254(g)(3)(B). Authorizations that in part funded
these programs have been reduced from $100 billion annually in 1973 to $22.77 billion
annually in 1982. See id. § 1254(u)(1).
84. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAMS-1981, supra note 14, at 13;
see also REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM- 1980, supra note 20, at 8 (annual
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program to compel municipal expertise.8 5
B. Modi[yzng the Construction Grants Program
I. Introduction
Reinstatement of adequate federal funding would significantly facili-
tate municipal compliance with CWA effluent standards. As noted ear-
lier, reduced funding merely increases long term costs86 and shifts
funding responsibilities to state and local governments which are unable
to marshal additional revenues. 87 Ideally, 3.5 billion dollars annually
should be authorized for the Title II Construction Grants Program. 88
Additionally, the seventy-five percent federal share should be reinstated.
Increased funding would both reaffirm the federal commitment to origi-
nal CWA goals 89 and accelerate national attainment of secondary treat-
ment standards.90
Present conservative fiscal and environmental policies, however, mili-
tate against future reinstatement of previous Title II funding levels. Crit-
ics allege that excessively generous federal grants foster a municipal
attitude that POTW projects are financed with free money.9 ' Reduced
appropriations less than half the amount annually authorized and needed to carry out
federally mandated tasks).
85. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 13.
The EPA has substituted O&M training programs with several other alternatives enjoying
only marginal success. For example, in 1977, the EPA issued guidance documents al-
lowing grant communities to use grant money during the final stage of construction and
initial plant start up for training of plant personnel. Id Many experts, however, perceive
this training to come too late in the process. Id
Evidence also indicates that training programs presently in effect fail to train POTW
personnel adequately for subsequent plant O&M. As one commentator noted:
Existing programs to train operators and provide them with the required infor-
mation to properly monitor, control, and operate their plants are ineffective.
Operators have not been able to transfer their classroom instruction to practical
on-site problem solving; they do not use much of the guidance and instructional
materials provided by the federal programs because they do not understand
them and they are provided with often conflicting information from a variety of
sources that are not held accountable for the instruction provided.
Id. at 12-13.
86. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
88. See Hearings on the Constriction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1529 (statement of
Natural Resources Defense Council). Present estimations reveal that CWA goals can be
satisfied within 12 years if federal funding is increased to $3.2 billion annually. Id. In
light of the adverse fiscal consequences of stretching out the Title II program, however,
authorizations should instead be increased to $3.5 to $4 billion annually. Id
89. id at 1532.
90. d at 1529.
Stable annual appropriations would greatly encourage local investment, thereby ac-
celerating POTW construction. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-
1980, supra note 20, at 10-11. Present uncertainty about future federal funding has dis-
couraged local investment. Id at 5.
91. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 67.
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federal funding would lead to improved stewardship and construction of
more cost-efficient facilities.92
In light of these current attitudes, efforts must focus upon maximizing
the return on a reduced federal investment. In response to past failures,
recent legislative and administrative initiatives have sought to improve
administration of the Construction Grants Program. While the success
of these efforts is still unknown, cause for optimism exists. Recent initia-
tives include: (1) selection of more cost-efficient treatment facilities;93 (2)
streamlined administration of Title II grant applications;94 and (3) local
financing of treatment facilities. 95
2. Cost-Efttient Fac'lities
Recent federal efforts have emphasized more efficient use of grant
money by limiting federal funding of excessively expensive wastewater
treatment projects. The CWA limits Title II construction grants to
projects for secondary or more stringent treatment, new interceptors, and
infiltration-inflow correction.96 Projects must constitute "the most eco-
nomical and cost-effective combination of treatment works over the life
of the project . . . ."97 Funding is no longer available to wastewater
92. Ste id.; see also id at 18 (generous 75% funding tends to encourage the use of overly
complex or sophisticated technologies).
93. See infta notes 96-125 and accompanying text.
94. See infa notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1) (1982). This limit, however, provided that the admin-
istrator continue to allocate 20% of the grants to other projects authorized under section
1292(2). Id
Additionally, communities that construct wastewater treatment facilities without fed-
eral funding may be reimbursed for project costs. See id § 1286(0. Previously ineligible
projects may be refunded only if the Administrator approves all plans, specifications, and
estimates before construction. Additionally, nonfunded projects must be constructed in
accordance with all procedures and requirements imposed upon Title II projects except
for procedures and requirements concerning projects constructed with the aid of previ-
ously allocated funds. Reimbursement will not be available where payments would ex-
ceed state allotments. Id
Many opposed federal reimbursement of previously constructed POTWs. See, e.g.,
Heanngs on the Consctron Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1724 (statement of Anne M.
Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (administration opposi-
tion to reimbursement). Critics argue that unrealistic expectations of future reimburse-
ment create little incentive to construct cost-efficient POTWs. Id. at 1725. Many favor
reimbursement, however, arguing that communities should not be penalized for moving
ahead in the absence of federal funding. See Hearngs on Municipal Wastewater Treatment,
supra note 52, at 22 (statement of Elizabeth Head, former president of the League of
Women Voters of Rhode Island).
97. See 33 U.S.C. § 1298(b) (1982). Making funding contingent upon "cost-effective-
ness" attempts to implement the CWA policy mandating that all POTWs shall be "the
most economical and cost-effective combination of devices and systems used in the storage,
treatment, recycling, and reclamation of municipal sewage . I..." d  § 1298(a). In con-
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treatment projects that exceed the current needs of the community.98
POTW reserve capacities that exceed current municipal needs must be
locally financed.99 Finally, the CWA limits funding for unnecessary ad-
vanced wastewater treatment1 00 and advanced secondary treatment
projects. 101
Legislation also encourages development and use of cost saving inno-
vative and alternative (I&A) sewage technologies.102 Innovative waste-
water treatment techniques are developed methods which represent a
significant advance over state of the art treatment techniques.103 Alter-
sidering whether a facility is cost-effective, the Administrator may consider construction,
operation, maintenance, and replacement costs. See id § 1298(b).
98. See id § 1284(a)(5). The CWA initially provided for funding of some reserve ca-
pacity. The amount of reserve capacity funded was determined by comparing the cost of
constructing reserves during initial construction, and the cost of adding the reserves at a
later date. In determining the amount eligible, the Administrator was to consider efforts
to reduce total sewage flow, projected populations, and projected commercial and indus-
trial development. Id.
POTW reserve capacity generated a great deal of debate before enactment of the
1981 amendments. Advocates claimed that refusing to fund reserve capacities would limit
local growth and result in noncompliance with federal standards by the time the POTW
was finally constructed. See Effects of Proposed Redutzons, supra note 49, at 233 (testimony of
Charles E. Nemir, Deputy Director, Texas Department of Water Resources); Ledbetter,
supra note 43, at 210 (restrictions on reserve capacity will limit growth by imposing sewer
connection moratoriums). Critics argue that communities should more appropriately bear
the burden of financing plant capacity for local growth. See Hearings on the Construction
Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1535 (statement of National Resources Defense Council).
Ultimately, Congress voted to abolish funding of reserve capacity. After October 1,
1984, no grants will be made to portions of a POTW that provide reserve capacities in
excess of existing needs. See 33 U.S.C. § 1284(a)(5) (1982). Funding will continue, how-
ever, for POTWs receiving grant money prior to this date. See id § 1284(c).
99. See generally supra note 98.
100. See 33 U.S.C. § 1286 (1982).
101. Id
102. See hnfra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. Indeed, consideration of I&A tech-
nology is mandatory. Before any applicant is eligible for federal grant money, the appli-
cant must demonstrate that innovative and alternative technologies have been fully
studied and evaluated. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(5) (1982). The CWA also requires that a
portion of the federal share be "set aside" for projects utilizing I&A technologies. See id
§ 1285(h), (i). Not less than one half of one percent of funds allotted to states must be set
aside for innovative projects. Id § 1285(i). Additionally, after September 30, 1981, be-
tween 4 and 7.5% of all federal funds allotted must be set aside for alternative or uncon-
ventional systems. Id.
103. Innovative wastewater treatment techniques are defined as:
[D]eveloped methods which have not been fully proven under the circumstances
of their contemplated use and which represent a significant advancement over
the state of the art in terms of meeting the national goals of cost reduction, in-
creased energy conservation or recovery, greater recycling and conservation of
water resources (including preventing the mixing of pollutants with water), rec-
lamation or reuse of effluents and resources (including increased productivity of
arid lands), improved efficiency and/or reliability, the beneficial use of sludges
or effluent constituents, better management of toxic materials or increased envi-
ronmental benefits.
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native technologies are proven nonconventional methods of treating
wastewater t0 4 Alternative technology differs from innovative technol-
ogy in the extent to which it has been developed and used. Alternative
technology has been proven and utilized in actual practice, whereas in-
novative technology has not been fully proven under the circumstances
of its contemplated use.'
0 5
Although I&A technologies significantly diminish local costs,1 0 6 com-
munities have traditionally been hesitant to employ such technologies.
Officials are hesitant to assume the economic and political risks of com-
mitting millions of dollars to POTWs using unproven technologies.107
Fearing subsequent liability, engineers are equally wary of recom-
mending I&A treatment techniques. 0 8
In response to these reservations, the CWA provides financial incen-
tives to communities willing to pursue I&A treatment technologies. Cost
effective wastewater treatment projects utilizing I&A technologies are eli-
gible for up to eighty-five percent federal funding,109 thirty percent more
40 C.F.R. § 35.970 app. E, para. 5 (1983).
104. Alternative wastewater treatment techniques "are proven methods which provide
for the reclaiming and reuse of water, productively recycle waste water constituents or
otherwise eliminate the discharge of pollutants, or recover energy." Id. para. 4. Alterna-
tive types of waste treatment include land treatment, aquifer recharge, aquaculture, con-
tainment ponds, treatment and storage prior to land application, and direct reuse. See,
e.g., Randolph, supra note 66, at 4.
105. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29534-35 (1979). Although the CWA does not define advanced
wastewater treatment (AWT), the EPA has promulgated regulations defining AWT as sys-
tems that provide 50% total nitrogen removal or that reduce BOD and suspended solids to
less than 10 mg/l each. Id.
Reducing the unnecessary funding of AWT projects can result in significant federal
savings. The EPA projects that 5120 billion is required to achieve full POTW compliance
with federal standards by the year 2000. Of these funds, over $1.4 billion constitutes fund-
ing for AWT projects. Further, these costs represent over 4% of total treatment needs and
3% of treatment projects. See 1980 NEEDS SURVEY, supra note 38, at 5, 8.
106. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29534-35 (1979). The EPA has defined Advanced Secondary
Treatment (AST) as treatment more stringent than secondary treatment, but less stringent
that AWT. Id As with AWT systems, funding cutbacks for AST projects can greatly
reduce the amount of money necessary to achieve compliance by the year 2000. The EPA
estimates that by the year 2000, $4.2 billion (in 1980 dollars) will be spent on construction
of AST systems. This constitutes nearly 12% of projected total treatment dollar needs and
12% of treatment projects. See 1980 NEEDS SURVEY, supra note 38, at 5, 8.
107. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 41;see
also 123 CONG. REC. 39, 170 (1977) (perception that I&A techniques involve greater risks
and higher costs than conventional technology).
108. See Hean'ngs on Munictpal Wastewater Treatment, supra note 52, at 11 (statement of
Robert Moore, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection).
109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(2) (1982). After September 30, 1981, communities that
apply for Title II construction grants to construct POTWs utilizing I&A technologies, are
entitled to a federal contribution that is at least 20% greater than the contribution for
conventional POTWs. Total federal contributions, however, may not exceed 85% of total
construction costs. Id
While federal officials remain committed to the development and use of I&A technol-
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than the federal share for conventional systems.,10 If an I&A system fails
within two years of completion, the municipality is entitled to receive
100 percent of all replacement costs."'
Although skepticism toward I&A technologies remains strong, many
communities are beginning to take advantage of federal incentives.12 As
of 1981, the EPA had awarded almost 700 I&A grants totaling nearly
900 million dollars."13 Local demand for I&A set-aside funds11 4 has also
gradually increased.' 15
Recent CWA amendments also acknowledge that expert administra-
tive guidance in selecting and designing new POTWs must be provided
if new technologies are to translate into economical, efficient treatment
facilities. In addition to mandating EPA design reviews,116 POTW
projects must also undergo a value engineering review.117 This review
attempts to identify unnecessarily high project costs before actual con-
ogies, federal incentives have actually declined. Prior to September 30, 1981, communities
were provided with an absolute federal contribution of 85%. See id § 1282(a)(2).
110. The federal share for conventional POTW construction costs is 55%. See id
§ 1282(a)(1). Prior to the 1981 amendments, the federal contribution was 75% of all pro-
ject costs. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
11. See 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(3). Under Section 1282(a)(3), the Administrator is au-
thorized to issue a grant to fund all costs necessary to modify or replace I&A facilities that
have not met design performance specifications. No funding is available, however, where
failure to meet design performance specifications is attributable to negligence and the
failure has significantly increased capital or O&M expenditures. Id
112. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PRoGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 41.
113. Id at 40; see also Hearngs on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1526
(statement of the Natural Resources Defense Council) (over 700 I&A grants totalling over
$800 million at the construction stage).
114. See supra note 102.
115. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 40
(two-fifths of the set-aside funds available for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 were committed
during the nine month period ending March 31, compared to the commitment of only
one-fifth of available set-aside funds during the initial 21-month period).
116. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also FISCAL REPORT 1984, supra note
24, at 34. Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1283(a) (1982), the EPA will review each grant applica-
tion, ensuring that the proposed facility is both technologically appropriate and within the
financial capabilities of the community. Id
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1298(c) (1982). Prior to the approval of any construction grant
exceeding $10 million, the Administrator shall require a "value engineering review." Id
This review attempts to identify unnecessarily high construction costs that may be re-
duced without compromising either the reliability or efficiency of the proposed project.
Id, see also FISCAL REPORT 1984, supra note 24, at 32 (per section 1298(c), the EPA in-
tends to oversee value engineering program to ensure efficient design of construction
projects).
Requiring value engineering has already yielded significant savings. As of 1980, 105
projects had undergone value engineering. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program,
supra note 2, at 1766 (statement of Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency). These reviews resulted in savings of over $157 million; nearly 5% of
total project costs. Id.
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struction.118 Communities are also encouraged to file a capital financing
plan that outlines future treatment needs, anticipated POTW expansion,
and financing schemes which will fund future expansion.19 Cognizant
of future needs and financial capabilities, administrative officials can bet-
ter advise communities that are designing and constructing wastewater
treatment facilities.
While administrative participation should improve municipal deci-
sionmaking, the imposition of liability on consulting architects and engi-
neers for POTW deficiencies should greatly facilitate proper design and
construction.120 In the past, consulting engineers and architects were
rarely held responsible for their recommendations, designs, or equip-
ment.1 21 The perception of unaccountability in the past encouraged par-
ticipation by firms with minimal expertise and experience in POTW
construction.12 2 Once construction was completed, substandard per-
formance became a local problem, often requiring expensive fix-up
grants. 1
23
The CWA attempts to discourage incompetent participation by hold-
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1298(c) (1982).
119. See id § 1281(o). Although not mandatory, the CWA encourages applicants to
file such a plan. Id Under section 1281(o), capital financing plans should project future
community treatment needs anticipated within the next 10 years. Id. § 1281(o)(1). The
capital financing plan should detail the nature, extent, timing, and cost of anticipated
expansion and reconstruction. Id § 1281(o)(2)-(3).
To further assist communities in properly planning effluent treatment facilities, the
EPA's Office of Water developed the Policy on Financial and Management Capability for
publicly owned treatment works in 1983. See FISCAL REPORT 1984, supra note 24, at 33.
This policy encourages communities to consider the entire range of financial impacts asso-
ciated with POTW construction. Id. Further, this policy guides communities toward se-
lecting cost-efficient designs that are technologically and financially well-suited to their
needs. Id
120. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 27,
30; Hearings on Municipal Wastewater Treatment, supra note 52, at 46 (statement of Alfred E.
Peloguin, Executive Secretary, New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commis-
sion). Others are ambivalent about imposing liability. The threat of liability is likely to
both increase project costs and reduce innovative project designs. Id. at 11 (statement of
Robert Moore, Director of Water Compliance Unit, Connecticut Department of Environ-
mental Protection).
121. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 27.
One expert noted:
The engineering design community and equipment manufacturers and suppliers
take key roles in the pollution control effort. Yet in providing their services they
are not held responsible for the decisions they make and the design of facilities,
for the reliability and operability of the facilities or equipment they furnish, nor
for the information they disseminate to plant administrators and operations per-
sonnel. As a result, the local community is put in the untenable position of
spending a lot of money for a treatment plant that may be poorly designed or is
incapable of being operated properly.
Id
122. Id at 23.
123. See supra note 69.
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ing supervising engineering firms accountable for deficient POTW de-
sign and construction. Design and construction engineers must continue
their relationship with grant applicants for one year after the completion
of construction and initial operation of the POTW.124 Where POTW
performance proves unsatisfactory, the supervising firm may be held
responsible. 125
3. Streamlined Administrative Procedures
Notwithstanding imminent deadlines and skyrocketing program costs,
rapid processing of grant applicants is counterproductive. Past program
failures clearly demonstrate that comprehensive and rational decision-
making is critical to the efficient design, construction, and administration
of treatment facilities. Undue acceleration of applicant evaluations min-
imizes the impact of initial EPA supervision, resulting in subsequent
POTW performance deficiencies.
If CWA objectives are to be achieved, however, efforts must be di-
rected toward simplifying the application process. Although agency offi-
cials have repeatedly echoed the need for streamlined implementation of
the Title II program,' 26 recent initiatives signal a genuine desire to expe-
dite grant applicants. Small communities with simple treatment require-
ments may receive a single grant for POTW construction, 127 thereby
circumventing the traditional three-step grant process.' 28 For larger fa-
cilities not amenable to one-step permitting, the EPA is presently revis-
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1284(d)(1) (1982). During this one year period, the engineer or engi-
neering firm must supervise POTW operation and train personnel in the proper operation
of the POTW. Id By continuing the relationship between the engineering firm and the
POTW for one year, the CWA attempts to increase project responsibility. Historically,
liability was difficult to impose on any one party since numerous local officials, engineers,
equipment manufacturers, citizens groups, and EPA officials all affected POTW construc-
tion. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 28. By
assigning responsibility to specific engineers, the threat of liability, and consequently the
need for competency, is increased.
125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1284(d)(3) (1982) (EPA may require indemnification from con-
tracting party).
126. See Heartngs on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1743 (statement of
Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency); FISCAL RE-
PORT 1984, supra note 24, at 31 (specific program objective is to streamline and simplify
program management requirements).
Attempts to streamline procedures are mandatory under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(o (1982). Under section 101(0, the Act encourages the minimization of paperwork
and interagency decision procedures. Id. Further, the Act encourages the prevention of
needless duplication and unnecessary delays. Id. Unfortunately, past efforts have ren-
dered this section "little more than a well-intentioned rhetorical flourish." REPORT ON
CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1980, supra note 20, at 5.
127. See 33 U.S.C. § 1283(a) (1982). Under section 1283(a), treatment works that cost
$8 million or less and serve a population of 25,000 or less may receive a single grant for the
cost of designing and constructing the POTW. d.
128. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
1984]
21
et al.: Regulation Of Noncompliant Publicly Owned Treatment Works Under T
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ing Title II grant requirements.129 These modifications seek to eliminate
duplicative requirements,130 differentiate between mandatory and dis-
cretionary procedures,13 1 and ensure fast-tracking for high priority
POTWs experiencing compliance difficulties.1
32
Although these efforts are laudable, additional modifications are re-
quired. One-step grants are currently limited to projects costing less than
eight million dollars or communities with populations under 25,000.133
In spite of federal attempts to consolidate permit requirements, problems
of duplication and conflict remain.1
34
4. Creative Funding
Municipal wastewater treatment authorities must find ways to finance
POTW projects creatively with less dependence on federal grant assist-
ance. Alternative financing would both reduce the demands placed on
the federal grants program and enable the EPA to concentrate its finan-
cial efforts on high priority municipalities. 135 By avoiding the lengthy
federal grant application process, communities can build treatment facil-
ities faster, thereby minimizing construction costs and enabling timely
compliance with CWA effluent deadlines.136 Consequently, the EPA's
129. See Heanngs on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1729 (statement of
Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
Although one-step permitting for small community treatment systems can effectively
accelerate the grant application process, the size and complexity of large metropolitan
municipal systems militates against one-step permitting for these facilities. See id. at 1536
(statement of Natural Resources Defense Council); Hearings on Municipal Wastewater Treat-
ment, supra note 52, at 10 (statement of Robert Moore, Director of Water Compliance
Unit, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection). Maintaining Step I and
Step II permitting for larger wastewater facilities is the only accurate method of ascertain-
ing water pollution needs, costs, and benefits, and permits long-term management of con-
struction needs and funds. Id
130. See Hearngs on Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1729 (statement of Anne
M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
131. Id
132. Id at 1743.
133. See 33 U.S.C. § 1283(a) (1982).
134. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1980, supra note 15, at 132.
135. POTW financial eligibility for Title II construction grants is determined by both
state and federal officials. Under section 1287, funding is authorized for the Construction
Grants Program. See 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1982). Funding is distributed to each state in
proportion to the state's statutorily authorized allotment. See id. § 1285(c). This allot-
ment scheme distributes money to individual states according to the ratio "that the esti-
mated cost of constructing all needed publicly owned treatment works in each State bears
to the estimated cost of construction of all needed publicly owned treatment works in all of
the States." Id § 1285(a). States then distribute these funds in accordance with their
state priority list. See id § 1296. Distribution at the state level is limited to POTWs utiliz-
ing certain eligible treatment techniques. Id
136. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PRoGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 54.
By circumventing the oppressive Title II application process, municipalities can proceed
to construct satisfactory POTWs within one-half to one-third the time expected. By
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municipal compliance policy encourages local authorities to develop
their own funding sources for construction, maintenance, replacement,
and compliance of their facilities.' 3 7 To encourage creative financing,
the EPA has warned all municipalities that they must meet the July 1,
1988 secondary treatment deadline whether or not federal grant aid is
available. 138
Although few programs have been enacted at the state level, officials
are actively seeking alternative financing schemes that will replace de-
clining federal contributions. 139 Some states hope to finance local
projects with increased state grants.140 In light of limited state resources,
however, most states intend to provide additional funds by increasing the
size and flexibility of their loan and loan guarantee programs. 14 ' These
programs might be financed through state tax increases,' 42 new bond
issues, 143 or increased contributions from current state revenues.'
44
speeding up the construction process, POTW construction costs are greatly reduced. Id.
Indeed, the accelerated construction process can reduce total project costs by nearly 40-
45%.
137. See WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (BNA) No. 79, at 2 (Sept. 30, 1982) (future
funding treatment).
138. Id Except for section 1311(i), the CWA does not make compliance with CWA
deadlines contingent upon the receipt of federal funding. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION
GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 55. Historically, however, the EPA has not
prosecuted municipal violators ineligible to receive federal funding, creating little incen-
tive for these municipalities to seek other means of financing. See id; Hearings on the Con-
struction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1553 (statement of Merilyn B. Reeves, Natural
Resources Director, League of Women Voters of the United States). Consequently, CWA
deadlines must apply notwithstanding grant eligibility, pressing local officials to seek alter-
native means of financing. See Heanngs on Muncipal Wastewater Treatment, supra note 52, at
23 (statement of Elizabeth Head, President, League of Women Voters of Rhode Island).
139. See FINANCING WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 32, at 37-38.
140. Id. at 41.
141. Id. at 38. For example, one promising alternative is the creation of a state infra-
structure bank. See WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (BNA) No. 84, at 1 (Dec. 9, 1982).
Under this program, all available funds from federal grants, state appropriations, private
capital, and proceeds from state bonds would be pooled into a revolving fund. Municipal-
ities would then become eligible to borrow money from this fund to finance local sewage
treatment projects. All loans would eventually be repaid, enabling other communities to
finance future projects from the same fund. Id
142. See FINANCING WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 32, at 40 (Colorado un-
successfully attempted to increase state taxes in order to fund a capital improvement bond
for water and wastewater projects).
143. Id at 41-42 (Missouri and Connecticut propose financing POTW construction
through increased bond revenues).
Local attempts to raise revenues through bond issues might be enhanced significantly
if the federal government guaranteed these bonds. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION
GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 56. Although critics argue that federal guaran-
tees simply create new federal fiscal exposure, the relative financial security of municipal
bonds makes this risk minimal. Id Further, defaults might be liquidated through money
specifically authorized for the Title II program. Id.
144. See FINANCING WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 32, at 40-41 (Texas at-
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III. INADEQUACY OF CWA ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
A. Introduction
The CWA equips both federal and state agencies with a formidable
array of enforcement mechanisms. When a municipal discharger is
either unable or unwilling to comply with its NPDES permit limita-
tions,14 5 either the EPA Administrator or the state146 may issue an ad-
ministrative compliance order or refer the POTW to the Justice
Department for judicial action. 14 7 Judicial action may result in civil
tempt to increase funding by setting aside one-half excess tax revenues to establish a
Water Assistance Fund); see also Efect of Proposed Reductions, supra note 49, at 233-36.
145. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). Municipal compliance with effluent discharge re-
quirements is effectuated through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). See id Pursuant to section 402(a)(1) of the Act, NPDES permits set forth the
precise amount of permissible discharge. Id Any discharge into navigable waters except
as authorized by the terms and conditions of a POTW's permit is prohibited under the
Act. Id § 1342(b). Although the EPA has ultimate authority over NPDES permits, sec-
tion 402(b) allows states to administer their own NPDES permits. States that wish to
administer their own permit programs must submit to the EPA a description of "the pro-
gram it proposes to establish and administer under State Law .... " Id The EPA must
approve the state permit program unless the Administrator determines that the program
fails to meet statutory guidelines. Once the EPA approves a state permit program, the
EPA must suspend its own issuance of permits in that state. Id § 134 2 (c). Where state
enforcement is unsatisfactory, however, the EPA may again step in, administering and
enforcing NPDES permits in that state. See United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp.
734, 739-40 (D. Del. 1981).
146. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1982). Where a POTW is in violation of its NPDES
permit limitation, the EPA will notify both the violator and the state of such finding. Id
Upon receiving notice from the EPA, the state must commence enforcement proceedings.
If state action has not been commenced within 30 days of the EPA notice, the EPA may
initiate appropriate enforcement action. Id; see also id. § 1342(i). While section 1342(c)(1)
suspends federal administration of NPDES permits in states administering their own
NPDES program, this suspension does not limit the right to commence federal enforce-
ment actions under section 1319. Id
Where the state has assumed administration of the NPDES permits, the state is to
take the lead in enforcement against noncompliant offenders. See OFFICE OF WATER
PROGRAM OPERATIONS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM]. To ensure a
coordinated state and federal enforcement response, the Municipal Management System
requires state agencies to: (1) establish an integrated database of common grant and per-
mit/compliance information; (2) coordinate information flow with appropriate federal
agencies; (3) coordinate initiation of regulatory responses to permit/grant violations; (4)
coordinate review and action on permit and grant extension requests; and (5) coordinate
development and modification of State Project Priority Lists. Id at 4.
147. See OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERATIONS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, NATIONAL MUNICIPAL POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR CONSTRUCTION GRANTS,
NPDES PERMITS, AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 6 (1979) [herein-
after cited as NATIONAL MUNICIPAL POLICY AND STRATEGY]. The National Municipal Pol-
icv and Strategy (NMPS) outlines the appropriate enforcement response mandated where
municipalities have violated effluent limitation or NPDES permit restrictions. Under the
NMPS, enforcement officials may issue noncompliant municipalities: (1) a permit exten-
sion pursuant to section 301(i)(1); (2) an administrative order setting forth a mandatory
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penalties,148 criminal sanctions,149 or injunctive relief. o50 Noncompliant
POTWs may also be blacklisted from contracting with any federal
agency. 51'
Despite this broad arsenal of sanctions, past enforcement efforts
against noncompliant dischargers have been inadequate. State and fed-
eral officials have instead directed enforcement efforts toward industrial
dischargers.' 52 Without an aggressive federal enforcement policy, mu-
nicipalities lack the incentive to construct and operate compliant
POTWs.153
Past enforcement failures are due in part to CWA sanctions which are
often inappropriate, leaving officials without effective penalties for
noncompliant POTWs. Although municipal offenders are clearly sub-
ject to CWA enforcement provisions,154 practical and political considera-
tions often militate against the use of judicially imposed civil, injunctive,
schedule of compliance; or (3) a notice of intent to commence judicial action that seeks to
compel satisfactory POTW performance. Id. Where a municipality is ineligible for a per-
mit extension, a section 309(a) (5) (A) administrative order must be issued. Id. at 22. This
order must set forth a schedule up to the final date for satisfying secondary treatment
standards. Id The schedule imposed, however, does not require the POTW to actually
achieve secondary treatment by the final date for compliance. Id. at 24. Rather, the last
compliance date on the schedule will be the last date prior to the final deadline for secon-
dary treatment, even if that date only takes the POTW through part of the process toward
final limits. Id.
Candidates for judicial action under the Municipal Referral Priority System (MRPS)
include: (1) all POTWs that require construction but are ineligible for a 301(i)(l) exten-
sion and will not receive a 309(a)(5)(A) administrative order; (2) recipients of 301(i)(1)
extensions, enforcement compliance schedule letters (ECSLs), or administrative orders
which subsequently violate such extensions, ECSLs, or orders; and (3) POTWs that have
completed construction but are not meeting effluent limits or other permit requirements.
Id. at 38. Referral priority rank pivots upon a host of factors including POTW size, mu-
nicipal population, POTW treatment level, existing health hazards, and past operation
and maintenance practices. Id at 38-40.
To coordinate federal and state monitoring and enforcement efforts, the EPA pub-
lished the Municipal Management System. See supra note 146.
148. Set 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
149. See id. § 1319(c)(1). Persons criminally liable are subject to a fine of up to $25,000
per day and imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id
150. See id § 1319(b).
151. Id. § 1368. Although available to enforcement officials, blacklisting is rarely uti-
lized. For example, only one source was blacklisted in 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 16324
(Chemical Formulators, Nitro, West Virginia).
152. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra" note 14, at 37.
Because most industrial dischargers have satisfied CWA standards, enforcement officials
now intend to concentrate their efforts on municipalities. See id; FISCAL REPORT 1984,
supra note 24, at 29.
153. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 37.
154. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1982). Section 309(a)(1) states that any person violating
sections 1311 (secondary treatment deadlines) or 1342 (NPDES permit requirements) shall
be subject to the enforcement provisions set forth in section 1319. Id. "Person" is defined
to include municipalities. See id § 1362(5). For purposes of criminal liability, "person" is
defined to include corporate officers. See id § 1319(c)(3).
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and criminal penalties. Without credible sanctions, EPA and state offi-
cials are in a poor bargaining position with noncompliant treatment
works. 155
B. Inappropriateness of Section 309 Sanctions
I. Civil Penalt'es
Effluent dischargers that fail to adhere to CWA limitations or NPDES
permit requirements may be assessed fines pursuant to the Act. 156 Al-
though the amount of the fine is within the discretion of the courts,
157 it
is generally in accordance with the EPA's "Civil Penalty Policy."' 158
Under this policy, fines are calculated to penalize past conduct and dis-
courage future noncompliance.1
59
While the EPA's use of civil penalties has successfully curbed nonmu-
nicipal violations, 60 practical considerations militate against the use of
civil penalties for noncompliant POTWs. Instead of punishing responsi-
ble public officials, fines are usually paid by innocent community resi-
dents in the form of increased taxes. 16 1 Penalties also prejudice future
155. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1980, supra note 15, at 123.
156. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
157. See Ohio v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20677,
No. 78-694 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Montgomery County Oct. 10, 1979). Determination of the
actual damage award is within the discretion of the court. See id The EPA's civil penalty
policies may be of some assistance in guiding the court's decision. These policies, however,
are not controlling upon the court. See id.
158. See EPA CIVIL PENALTY POLICY FOR MAJOR SOURCE VIOLATORS OF CLEAN
AIR ACT AND CLEAN WATER ACT (Apr. 11, 1978), reprzied in ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Federal
Laws) at 41:1102-:1110 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL PENALTY POLICY]. The EPA's
civil penalty policy applies to all major and minor violators of CWA water quality stan-
dards. See id at 41:1103. Specifically, the policy applies to violations that result from
failures to make capital or operation and maintenance expenditures necessary to meet
CWA standards. The policy does not apply to penalties for criminal violations or viola-
tions of court decrees. Id
159. See id. In calculating a minimum civil penalty, the EPA considers several factors.
A base penalty is determined by considering: (1) the sum appropriate to redress the harm
or risk to the public health or environment; (2) the sum appropriate to remove the eco-
nomic benefit gained or to be gained from noncompliance; (3) the sum appropriate as a
penalty for the violator's recalcitrance and indifference; and (4) the sum appropriate to
recover unusual and extraordinary enforcement costs. Id at 41:1104. From this base pen-
alty, reductions are made for mitigating factors including noncompliance attributable to
the federal government and noncompliance due to factors beyond the violator's control.
Id
While the EPA will seek the minimum civil penalty upon commencement of judicial
action, a lesser value may be assessed as an incentive for nonjudicial settlement. Id.
Deviation from the minimum civil penalty, however, should not exceed 25% since initial
enforcement action presumes a high likelihood of success at trial. Id.
160. See supra note 19 (discussing industrial discharger compliance).
161. See Court-Created Receivership Emerging as Remedy For Persistent Noncompliance with En-
vironmental Laws, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,059, 10,062 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Court-Created Receivership].
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municipal attempts to achieve compliance by diverting limited funds
from local wastewater projects. 162 Unlike penalties assessed against pri-
vate violators, penalties requiring cities to pay funds to the federal treas-
ury raise federalism issues.163 Finally, because POTWs are nonprofit
public facilities, imposing penalties against them would run counter to
the EPA's policy of imposing penalties to make pollution unprofitable. 164
Since civil fines are counterproductive, the EPA is reluctant to impose
fines that economically discourage noncompliance. Unlike industrial dis-
chargers, municipal penalties fail to reflect economic benefits gained
from noncompliance.165 Instead, penalties are based primarily upon the
city's ability to pay.166 Where facility owners can demonstrate that the
assessed fines impose an undue financial hardship, the EPA may reduce,
postpone, or even excuse the penalty.167
2. Injunctive Rehef
As with civil penalties, it is often inappropriate for state or federal offi-
cials to seek injunctive relief against a municipal sewage treatment facil-
ity. Unlike private endeavors, communities are often without alternative
facilities which could replace their POTWs.168 Closing down a major
metropolitan wastewater treatment facility or imposing a moratorium on
future sewer connections169 could seriously threaten the community's
162. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1981, supra note 14, at 37.
163. See Court-Created Receivership, supra note 161, at 10,062; see also ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY-1980, supra note 15, at 123 (EPA has difficulty forcing cities to pay fines to the
federal treasury).
164. See CIVIL PENALTY POLICY, supra note 158, at 41:1109. The policy provides:
Because state and municipal budgeting and financial decisions are generally
concerned with the allocation of tax derived public funds for provision of public
services for which there is no fee, service, or user charge collected (unlike utili-
ties), rather than the sale of goods or services, recovering the economic benefit of
delayed compliance is somewhat less applicable.
Id; see also Reed, supra note 21, at 561-62.
165. See CIVIL PENALTY POLICY, supra note 158, at 41:1109 (economic benefit of
delayed compliance should be calculated and considered but need not be imposed where
inappropriate).
166. See id. When calculating a civil penalty for municipal violators, a minimum civil
penalty can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. In evaluating each situation,
officials should consider the "size of the facility, and, in a municipal case, the stze and re-
sources of the municipality. " Id. (emphasis added).
167. See id at 41:1107; see also WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (BNA) 911:1055 (penalty
postponement and forgiveness based upon inability to pay).
168. For example, St. Paul's Metropolitan Sewage Treatment Plant handles the de-
mands of nearly 1.5 million Minneapolis-St. Paul residents. This constitutes nearly 80% of
the metropolitan area. See Minnesota Pollution Control Agency News Release (Oct. 28, 1981).
169. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1982). Section 402(h) of the CWA permits a moratorium
on sewer hookups where the municipality fails to satisfy effluent limitations. Id; see also
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL POLICY AND STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 37.
Unfortunately, sewer connection moratoria are not always equitable. While such
moratoria coerce compliance from municipalities that wish to grow, sanctions are often
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health and welfare. 170
Because injunctive relief is impractical, the EPA seldom attempts to
enjoin the operation of wastewater treatment facilities that are violating
the effluent limitations set forth in their NPDES permits.' 71 The EPA
will not enjoin noncomplying facilities if they have plans for replace-
ment.172 Only noncomplying facilities with no replacement plans will be
shut down. 173 Where shutdowns are appropriate, however, the EPA is
required to evaluate the POTW's importance to the community.
174




Unlike corporate officers, public officials are generally immune to
criminal actions brought by water quality enforcement officials, because
political considerations militate against jailing elected officials.176 Con-
sequently, the effective threat of criminal prosecution is unavailable to
officials seeking to coerce municipal compliance. Although municipal of-
ficers are occasionally prosecuted,177 criminal actions are generally re-
misdirected toward growing municipalities that, while dependent upon the POTW, are
outside of the violators' jurisdiction. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-
198 1, supra note 14, at 37.
Nevertheless, sewer moratoria are seen as one method of stimulating municipal com-
pliance. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1543 (testimony of
Merilyn B. Reeves, Natural Resources Director, League of Women Voters).
170. See Court-Created Receiversh'p, supra note 161, at 10,062.
171. See MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 146, at E2 (sewer ban restric-
tions only where municipality is undergoing significant growth and violations are so clear
and serious as to offset political outcry).
172. See Enforcement of Environmental Regulations. Heartngs Before the Subcomm. on Environmen-
tal Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 292
(1979), reprinted in AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAw: 1980, at 608 (E.L.I.
1980). "It is the Agency's policy to consider seriously allowing BPT-violating and SIP-
violating facilities to postpone closure in consent decrees up to the time necessary for the
expeditious installation of replacement facilities . I..." d
173. See id. at 293. "In some cases, there may be a need to provide short shutdown
periods in consent decrees for limited life facilities that are violating statutory treatment
deadlines, [and] have no intention of achieving compliance. ... Id.
174. See id. Before determining whether or not the EPA will shut down a noncomp-
liant POTW, agency officials must consider the:
Extent of envjronmental degradation caused by the facility; [e]xtent to which
non-compliance was the result of circumstances not within the control of the
facility; [d]egree of importance to the plant or firm of the operations of the facil-
ity; [s]ignificance of the facility to the community employment base;
[p]robability that displaced employees will secure new positions; [t]ime elapsed
since statutory deadlines.
Id
175. Id Normally, shutdowns are immediate. In some situations, however, the detri-
mental effects on the community demand a future shutdown. See supra note 174.
176. See supra note 154.
177. See, e.g., Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 622 F.2d 4 (lst Cir. 1980) (Mayor
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served for "willful, substantial,"178 and readily provable179 violations
where agency authority has been intentionally and deliberately
flouted.18o Criminal prosecution of negligent violations is limited to ac-
tions tantamount to gross, culpable, or flagrant negligence.181 Because
municipal officials face only a remote possibility of prosecution, the
threat of such prosecution provides little incentive for compliance.
C Enforcement Recommendations
I. Admim'strative Enforcement
Attempts to enforce municipal compliance through litigation are gen-
erally counterproductive. As discussed earlier, judicially imposed civil
and criminal sanctions are often inappropriate for municipal offend-
ers.18 2 Litigation deprives officials of the flexibility available when
fashioning penalties at the administrative level.18 3 Officials pursuing ju-
dicial relief also run the risk that court sympathies will favor the offend-
ing POTW.184 Although CWA requirements are absolute, courts have
frequently fashioned relief favorable to the noncompliant
municipality. 185
Past POTW enforcement actions reflect the EPA's preference for non-
judicial proceedings. Formal EPA policies recommend that the majority
convicted of contempt for failing to comply with court-ordered schedule of compliance
which would bring municipal POTW into compliance with CWA requirements).
178. 8 [Curr. Dev.] ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1650.
179. See id.
Agency officials lack enthusiasm for criminal actions because constitutional protec-
tions, such as the right against self-incrimination, and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, make conviction difficult. See United States v. Ward, 484 U.S. 242
(1980).
180. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MEMO-
RANDA ON ENFORCING STATUTORY JULY 1, 1977, WATER POLLUTION REQUIREMENTS,
reprintedin 8 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 248 (June 10, 1977).
181. See Air and Water Act Enforcement Problems-A Case Study, 34 Bus. LAw. 665, 701
(1979).
182. See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text.
183. See Quarles, Widespread Noncomphance and the Need to Rethink Enforcement, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 15 (A.B.A. Standing Comm. on Envtl. L. 1978).
184. See supra note 58. Although State Water Control Bd v. Train reaffirmed the EPA's
interpretation of CWA deadlines, the court recognized that the concerns of good faith
violators were crucial to the welfare of the community. 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977).
Train is one of the many decisions in which courts have ruled in favor of dischargers who
were clearly in violation of federal pollution laws. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
Litigation poses other hazards. In addition to its cost, the pace of the decisionmaking
process is prohibitively slow, especially where the court initially provides a temporary in-
junction. More importantly, litigation draws attention to procedural technicalities. See
generally L. LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 20
(1980).
185. See supra notes 165-67.
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of noncompliant POTWs be referred to the Justice Department for judi-
cial action. 186 In practice, however, relatively few cases are referred. 187
Between 1977 and 1980, only four percent of all cases in which the EPA
commenced some form of enforcement action were referred. 188 A large
percentage of these actions was settled out of court.189 In the vast major-
ity of cases, the EPA preferred to issue a notice of violation, an adminis-
trative order demanding compliance, or an extended schedule for
compliance. 190
CWA objectives will most likely be effectuated through the continued
use of administrative remedies. 19 Action pursued at this level puts en-
forcement officials in a stronger bargaining position for a number of rea-
sons. Administrative processing allows greater flexibility in fashioning
and enforcing the sanctions most likely to facilitate compliance.192 Be-
cause these sanctions are initially enforced by administrative officials, less
reliance is placed upon courts which may be sympathetic to the noncom-
pliant municipality. 193 When agency decisions are reviewed, courts fre-
quently defer to the expertise of the relevant agency.1
94
186. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL POLICY AND STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 6. Pursu-
ant to this policy, the EPA will only grant extensions to POTWs that will definitely re-
ceive federal assistance in time to meet the 1988 deadline. Id at 7. For categories 1
through 3, the EPA will deny requests for extensions. Instead, the EPA will either issue
an Administrative Order demanding immediate compliance pursuant to section
309(a)(5)(A) or refer the matter to the Department of Justice for legal action. Id. For
categories 4 through 6, the EPA advises enforcement officials to refer the matter for judi-
cial action. Id
187. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1981, supra note 7, at 82. Although the EPA in-
stigated 1672 enforcement actions against municipal offenders between 1977 and 1980,
only 67 of these were referred to the Department of Justice for litigation. Id This
amounts to only 4% of all enforcement actions.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Between 1977 and 1980, the EPA issued 344 notices of violation. These con-
stituted 21% of all municipal enforcement actions. In the same period of time, the EPA
issued 1261 Administrative Orders which constituted 75% of all municipal enforcement
actions. Id
191. See Quarles, supra note 183, at 16.
192. Id.; see also Macbeth, The Needfor Flexibility and Variety in Environmental Enforcement,
in ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 13 (A.B.A. Standing Comm. on Envtl. L. 1978).
193. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
194. See Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through The Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
817 (1977). The role of the judiciary is not to choose between complex and confusing
alternatives. Rather, the role of the courts is to review the decisionmaking process, insur-
ing that all procedural safeguards are complied with. Once all have had a right to partici-
pate, the choice of two competing alternatives should be made by the agency with the
requisite expertise. Id. at 823; see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 656
F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court may set aside agency decision where agency action








While administrative enforcement is preferable, many violators per-
ceive agency action as an opportunity to delay compliance and escape
judicial sanctions. For such POTWs, compliance must be coerced with
the threat of litigation. Only judicial action demonstrates the gravity of
federal efforts, motivating genuine local attempts to satisfy existing water
quality standards.
Successful judicial enforcement, however, depends upon utilizing sanc-
tions likely to spur intransigent municipalities. As noted earlier, present
economic and political considerations militate against the use of civil and
criminal penalties, fostering a perception of municipal immunity. Judi-
cial action must impose credible sanctions that are adaptable to munici-
palities, thereby compelling POTW compliance.
One effective alternative to administrative action is the EPA's use of
judicially enforced consent decrees. 19 5 Under the terms of such a decree,
the EPA and the noncompliant POTW may agree to a mandatory
schedule of compliance196 and use of private engineering to correct past
deficiencies. Failure to abide by the decree's provisions will place the
offender in contempt of court.
19 7
The Rhode Island Federal District Court case of United States v. City of
Providence 198 illustrates the effectiveness of judicial enforcement of con-
sent decrees. In Providence, the city and the EPA entered into a consent
decree scheduling the city wastewater treatment plant's compliance with
NPDES requirements.' 99 When the POTW failed to comply with the
terms of the decree, city officials requested that the court either annul or
195. Consent decrees are privately negotiated contracts entered into with the solemn
sanction of the court. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Copperweld Steel Co.,
230 F. Supp. 383, 390 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
In light of past successes, the EPA views judicially enforced consent decrees as an
effective means of facilitating compliance. See Hearngs on the Constructzn Grants Program,
supra note 2, at 1713 (statement of Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency).
196. See, e.g., United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 609 (D.R.I. 1980).
197. See id at 609-11. Unlike private contracts or stipulation agreements, consent de-
crees are court sanctioned. Consequently, unless both parties consent, courts will not ex-
cuse compliance where the parties both understood and assented to the terms of the
decree. See Clinchfield Stone Co. v. Stone, 36 Tenn. App. 252, 254 S.W.2d 8 (1952).
Consent decrees may be modified, however, where subsequent statutory changes have
made previously negotiated compliance schedules inadequate or oppressive. See 33 Pub.
L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1633 (1981). Pursuant to the CWA, parties to a federal consent
decree establishing a deadline, schedule, or timetable for the construction of POTWs may
reexamine the provisions of such consent decrees where mandated by equity. Id. But see
NRDC v. Gorsuch, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20371 (D.D.C. 1982) (1977
CWA amendments do not excuse compliance with a previously negotiated 1976 consent
decree).
198. 492 F. Supp. 602 (D.R.I. 1980).
199. See id. at 605.
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modify the decree.200 The district court rejected the municipality's re-
quest, ruling that the court's authority to modify a previously bargained-
for consent decree was narrowly limited.2 1 The court held that to be
excused from compliance, a defendant must demonstrate that compel-
ling or extraordinary circumstances have arisen that render the decree
unreasonably oppressive. 202 Although the defendant municipality would
be better off if the decree were voided, it did not suffer hardship so ex-
treme and unexpected as to warrant nonperformance.203 Accordingly,
failure to adhere to the decree would place the municipality in contempt
of court.
2° 4
Consent decrees have unique advantages. They are negotiated at the
administrative level, thereby incurring the benefits of agency expertise
and flexibility 20 5 as well as the weight of judicial enforcement. Consent
decrees are specifically binding on city officers, increasing the incentive
to adhere to the agreement's terms.206
Another promising judicial sanction finding increasing use against in-
transigent violators is the common law remedy of receivership.207 Where
injunctive relief or civil penalties are either inappropriate or inadequate,
courts may appoint a single administrator with virtually unrestrained
authority to manage the violating facility until it complies with environ-
mental standards. 208 This broad authority derives from the broad range
of equitable powers available to the court to enforce and effectuate its
200. See id.
201. See id. at 609.
202. See id
203. Id (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)). The Swif Court
stated the current rule:
No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they
are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying
that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a clear showing of
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to
change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all
concerned.
Id. at 119.
204. See 492 F. Supp. at 609-11.
205. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
206. See 492 F. Supp. at 605.
207. See Court-Created Receivership, supra note 161, at 10,059. Outside of the enviro-
mental arena, receivership has enjoyed significant success where ordinary attempts to gain
municipal compliance have been ineffective. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d
527 (1st Cir. 1976) (receiver appointed to implement desegregation program in Boston
school district); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (temporary re-
ceiver appointed to operate state prison system where conventional attempts to alleviate
constitutional violations were unsuccessful).
208. See Court-Created Receivership, supra note 161, at 10,059. The receiver's authority
includes the power to borrow funds and hire consultants, as well as the "full power to
manage, control, and deal with all items, assets, properties, contracts and other matters
incident to his responsibilites." See Town of Greenwich v. Connecticut Dept. of Transp.,
10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20178 (D. Conn. 1980).
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Although the EPA has historically viewed receivership as an available
enforcement tool,2lO receivership was only recently used in environmen-
tal litigation in United States v. City of Detroit. 211 In Detroit, the defendant
POTW repeatedly failed to adhere to NPDES permit requirements and
judicial enforcement orders. 2 12 Rather than pursuing conventional sanc-
tions, the court placed the plant under the direct control of a receiver
who was given full authority to operate the facility until compliance was
achieved.2 13 Explaining its departure from conventional enforcement
mechanisms, the court stated that:
Where '[t]he more usual remedies-contempt proceedings and further
injunctions-[are] plainly not very promising as they [invite] further
confrontation and delay; and when the usual remedies are inadequate,
a court of equity is justified, particularly in aid of an outstanding in-
junction, in turning to less common ones, such as a receivership, to get
the job done.' 2 14
Court-imposed receivership offers unique advantages in its adaptabil-
ity to municipal offenders and coercive impact. 215 Unlike monetary or
injunctive sanctions, receivership does not prejudice community inter-
ests. 2 16 Because receivership is a credible sanction, enforcement officials
enjoy a more effective bargaining position. 2 17 Municipalities that previ-
ously viewed themselves as immune from enforcement proceedings are
now on notice that effective municipal enforcement mechanisms exist
and will be utilized where other remedies are ineffective. 2'
8
IV. CONCLUSION
Few will dispute that past municipal performance under the CWA has
been disappointing. Unlike their industrial counterparts, public dis-
chargers have distinguished themselves in their consistent inability to
comply with federally imposed water quality standards. Responsibility
209. See United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512, 520 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
210. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL POLICY AND STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 37 (judicial
referral can result in imposition of a special master); CIVIL PENALTY POLICY, supra note
158, at 41:1109 (EPA may seek appointment of a special master to ensure municipality
diligently undertakes all work necessary to satisfy compliance schedule).
211. 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
212. Id In an initial attempt to obtain POTW compliance, the EPA entered into a
consent agreement with the city which required the city to adhere to rigid discharge re-
quirements and to secure financing to construct plant improvements. Soon after the de-
cree was negotiated, however, the plant was in violation of effluent requirements set forth
in the decree. Id
213. See id at 520.
214. Id (quoting Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (Ist Cir. 1976)).
215. See Court-Created Receiuersh'p, supra note 161, at 10,059.
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for past failures rests at all levels of government, ranging from federal
officials unable to fund and administrate Title II programs adequately,
to local officials unable to design, construct, and operate cost-efficient
treatment facilities. Even with a determined commitment by both fed-
eral and state authorities, nationwide municipal compliance with the
CWA's original mandate remains a distant goal.
Yet in spite of past problems, CWA regulation of POTWs has not been
a total failure. Since 1972, over 20,000 project grants have been
awarded.2 19 Almost 10,000 of these projects have been completed with
3000 POTWs on-line reducing municipal water pollution.22 ° While
many dischargers have failed to attain secondary treatment, removal of
primary pollutants has increased by sixty-five percent.2 2 1 Indeed, disap-
pointment with past efforts is in part unjustified, since expectations were
initially premised upon unrealistic deadlines.
222
In light of past triumphs and defeats, future efforts must concentrate
upon refining the existing municipal program. The amendments en-
acted in 1977 and 1981 acknowledge this by reaffirming original goals223
and seeking compliance by fine tuning the original Act. While several
initial deficiencies have been addressed, much remains to be done. Fu-
ture legislation must promote better administration, design, construction,
O&M, and enforcement of POTWs. Only then will our nation achieve
water quality standards consistent with CWA goals and public
expectations.
224
219. See Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, supra note 2, at 1526 (statement of
Natural Resources Defense Council).
220. See id.
221. See id. at 1546 (statement of Merilyn B. Reeves, Natural Resources Director,
League of Women Voters of the United States) (since 1973, removal of BOD and total
suspended solids has increased by 65%).
222. See REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION GRANTS PROGRAM-1980, supra note 20, at 3. As
observed in the Report: "The reasons for the relatively lackluster performance of the con-
struction grants program are many; chief among these are that the cleanup task has con-
sistently been underestimated and the ability of the Federal Government to administer
such a program has been grossly overestimated." Id
223. See 13 WEEKLY COMP. O' PRES. Doc. 1933 (Jan. 2, 1978). Amendments enacted
in 1977 were viewed by President Carter as nothing more than a "midcourse correction,"
necessary in light of unanticipated problems in the original Act. All initial goals were still
embraced. Id
224. See, e.g., American Attitudes Toward Clean Water.- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environ-
mental Pollution of the Comm. on Environment and Publi Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). A
recent Harris Survey explored the myth that citizens give strong environmental protection
secondary priority to other public concerns such as unemployment. Id at 10. In reality,
citizens do not feel that they must opt for either economic growth or environmental
cleanup. Id at 11. Indeed, 89% indicated that such a choice is unnecessary. Id
Additionally, 88% perceive water pollution attributable to sewage as a serious prob-
lem in America. Id at 12. Fifty-nine percent feel that current standards are not protec-
tive enough. Id at 14. While 94% wish to keep water quality standards at least as strict,
60% desire that they be stricter. Id at 14-15. More importantly, 70% indicated that they
were willing to pay more for improved water quality. Id at 18.
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